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case inbetween, namely the class of (generic) symmetric 3x3 supermodular coordination games. This class of games 
are shown to always have a unique MP-maximizer, and its complete characterization is given. A nondegenerate 
example demonstrates that own-action quasiconcave supermodular games may have more than one LP-maximizers.
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     1. Introduction
A game is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996) if it admits a
potential function, a real-valued function deﬁned on the set of action pro-
ﬁles such that the change in any player’s payoﬀ resulting from switching
actions is proportional to the change in the value of this function.1 The
best response correspondence of a potential game thus coincides with that
of a pure common interest game in which the payoﬀ function of each player
is given by the potential function. A potential maximizer, an action proﬁle
that maximizes a potential function, is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
and this equilibrium does not depend on a particular choice of a potential
function.
Potential maximizers have nice “equilibrium selection” properties: Ui
(2001) shows that a unique potential maximizer is robust to incomplete
information (Kajii and Morris 1997), while Hofbauer and Sorger (1999,
2002) show that it is a unique equilibrium that is absorbing and globally
accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for small frictions (Matsui and
Matsuyama 1995). In 2 × 2 coordination games, potential maximization
agrees with risk dominance: that is, 2 × 2 coordination games are potential
games, where the risk-dominant equilibrium maximizes the potential func-
tion. Beyond 2×2 games, however, the class of potential games is nongeneric
as they are deﬁned by equalities.
In games with certain monotonicity properties, in particular in super-
modular games (also known as games with strategic complementarities),
the nice results have been proved (through versions of “comparison prin-
ciple”) to continue to hold in “generalized” potential games where those
equalities are replaced with certain inequalities. More precisely, Morris and
Ui (2005) introduce the concepts of monotone potential maximizer (MP-
maximizer) and local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer) and show that
an MP-maximizer of a supermodular game is robust to incomplete infor-
mation and so is an LP-maximizer if the game has diminishing marginal
returns (in which case LP-maximizer coincides with MP-maximizer). By
Oyama et al. (2008, OTH henceforth), an MP-maximizer of a supermodular
game is shown also to satisfy the stability condition under perfect foresight
dynamics.2 On the other hand, except for 2×2 games these generalized po-
tential conditions are typically not easy to inspect. Morris (1999) presents
an example of a symmetric 4 × 4 supermodular game that has no MP- or
LP-maximizer.3
1More precisely, such a game is called a “weighted” potential game, while it is called
an “exact” potential game if the payoﬀ change is always exactly equal to the change in
the potential. In this note, the term “potential game” refers to the former.
2See also Oyama and Tercieux (2009) for further developments. Okada and Tercieux
(2008) show that in supermodular games, an LP-maximizer with constant weights is
stochastically stable under the log-linear dynamics of Blume (1993).
3Beyond two-player games, it has been known that asymmetric three-player unanimity
1In this note, we study MP- and LP-maximizers in symmetric 3×3 super-
modular coordination games. We ﬁrst establish a generic existence and
a characterization of MP-maximizer for these games. Note that an MP-
maximizer, if any, is known to be unique in generic supermodular games
(OTH 2008). While those of LP-maximizer for this class of games have
been given by Morris (1999) and Frankel et al. (2003, FMP henceforth),
we also show that there is a non-empty open set of symmetric 3 × 3 super-
modular coordination games that have two LP-maximizers, and these games
possibly satisfy own-action quasiconcavity (FMP 2003).
2. Deﬁnitions and Known Facts
By R, R+, and R++, we denote the set of real numbers, the set of nonnegative
real numbers, and the set of positive real numbers, respectively.
Let G = (I,(Ai)i∈I,(ui)i∈I) be an N ≥ 2 player supermodular game,
where I = {1,...,N} is the set of players, Ai = {0,1,...,ni} the linearly
ordered set of actions for player i ∈ I, and ui: A =
Q
i∈I Ai → R the payoﬀ
function for player i satisfying supermodularity: for all i ∈ I, all ai,a0
i ∈ Ai,
and all a−i,a0








whenever ai < a0
i and a−i ≤ a0
−i. For i ∈ I, denote by ∆(A−i) the set of
probability distribution over A−i. For a function f : A → R, a probability
distribution πi ∈ ∆(A−i), and a nonempty subset of actions A0















i ∈ Ai, we denote
[a0
i,a00
i ] = {ai ∈ Ai | a0
i ≤ ai ≤ a00
i }.
An action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a (weighted) potential maximizer (Monderer
and Shapley 1996) of G if there exists a function v: A → R with v(a∗) > v(a)








Such a function v is called a potential function for a∗. Note that in this
case, bri
v(π) = bri
ui(πi) holds for all i ∈ I and πi ∈ ∆(A−i). It is easy
to see that any game has at most one potential maximizer. We shall be
interested in two variants of the notion of potential maximizer due to Morris
games (Carlsson 1989, Morris and Ui 2005, OTH 2008, 2009) and symmetric 3 × 3 × 3
supermodular games (Takahashi 2008) may not have an MP- or LP-maximizer.
2and Ui (2005), monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer) and local
potential maximizer (LP-maximizer). We employ the simpliﬁed versions
and their reﬁnements due to OTH (2008).
MP-maximizer and its reﬁnement, strict MP-maximizer, are deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1. (a) Action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is an MP-maximizer of G if there
exists a function v: A → R with v(a∗) > v(a) for all a 6= a∗ such that for all












Such a function v is called a monotone potential function for a∗.
(b) Action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a strict MP-maximizer of G if there exists
a function v: A → R with v(a∗) > v(a) for all a 6= a∗ such that for all i ∈ I












Such a function v is called a strict monotone potential function for a∗.
Notice that the ‘max’ (‘min’, resp.) in the right-had side of (1) ((2), resp.)
is replaced by the ‘min’ (‘max’, resp.) in the right-had side of (3) ((4), resp.).
A (strict) MP-maximizer is a (strict) Nash equilibrium, and a potential
maximizer is a strict MP-maximizer. A strict MP-maximizer is always an
MP-maximizer, and for a generic choice of payoﬀs, an MP-maximizer is a
strict MP-maximizer.
From OTH (2008), we have:4
Fact 1 (OTH 2008). A supermodular game can have at most one strict
MP-maximizer.
LP-maximizer and strict LP-maximizer are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. (a) Action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is an LP-maximizer of G if there
exists a function v: A → R with v(a∗) > v(a) for all a 6= a∗ such that for all
4OTH (2008, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) show that a strict MP-maximizer of a super-
modular game is a unique equilibrium that is absorbing and globally accessible under
perfect foresight dynamics when the degree of friction is small. Hence, a supermodular
game cannot have more than one strict MP-maximizers.
3i ∈ I, there exists a function µi: Ai \ {a∗
i} → R+ such that if ai < a∗
i, then
for all a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai)
 
v(ai + 1,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)

≤ ui(ai + 1,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i), (5)
and if ai > a∗
i, then for all a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai)
 
v(ai − 1,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)

≤ ui(ai − 1,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i). (6)
Such a function v is called a local potential function for a∗.
(b) Action proﬁle a∗ is a strict LP-maximizer of G if there exists a
function v: A → R with v(a∗) > v(a) for all a 6= a∗ such that for all i ∈ I,
there exists a function µi: Ai \ {a∗
i} → R++ such that if ai < a∗
i, then for
all a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai)
 
v(ai + 1,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)

≤ ui(ai + 1,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i), (7)
and if ai > a∗
i, then for all a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai)
 
v(ai − 1,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)

≤ ui(ai − 1,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i). (8)
Such a function v is called a strict local potential function for a∗.
An LP-maximizer is a strict LP-maximizer if one can take strictly posi-
tive numbers for the weights µi.5
The game G is said to satisfy diminishing marginal returns (or own-
action concavity) if for all i ∈ I, all ai 6= 0,ni, and all a−i ∈ A−i,
ui(ai,a−i) − ui(ai − 1,a−i) ≥ ui(ai + 1,a−i) − ui(ai,a−i).
For a function v: A → R, let Gv = (I,(Ai)i∈I,(v)i∈I) be the game in which
all players have the common payoﬀ function v. By Morris and Ui (2005)
(see also OTH 2008, Lemma 4.2), we have:
Fact 2 (Morris and Ui 2005). If the game G has a (strict) LP-maximizer a∗
with a (strict) local potential function v and if G or Gv satisﬁes diminishing
marginal returns, then a∗ is a (strict) MP-maximizer with the same function
v.
Therefore, from Fact 1 we have:
Fact 3 (OTH 2008). A supermodular game that satisﬁes diminishing marginal
returns can have at most one strict LP-maximizer.
5Morris (1999) and FMP (2003) give a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition of LP-maximizer,
which is weaker than strict LP-maximizer.
4In Section 3, we will show that a supermodular game without diminishing
marginal returns may have multiple strict LP-maximizers.
The notion of p-dominance (Kajii and Morris 1997), a many-player
generalization of risk-dominance, provides a suﬃcient condition for MP-
maximizer.
Deﬁnition 3. Let p = (p1,...,pN) ∈ [0,1)N.
(a) Action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a p-dominant equilibrium of G if for all i ∈ I,
a∗
i ∈ bri(πi) holds for all πi ∈ ∆(A−i) with πi(a∗
−i) ≥ pi.
(b) Action proﬁle a∗ is a strict p-dominant equilibrium of G if for all
i ∈ I, {a∗
i} = bri(πi) holds for all πi ∈ ∆(A−i) with πi(a∗
−i) > pi.
For p ∈ [0,1), we say that a∗ is a (strict) p-dominant equilibrium if it is
a (strict) (p,...,p)-dominant equilibrium. In a 2×2 coordination game, the
risk-dominant equilibrium is a strict (p1,p2)-dominant equilibrium for some
(p1,p2) such that p1 + p2 < 1 (Kajii and Morris 1997; see also Morris 1999
or FMP 2003).
As shown by Morris and Ui (2005) (see also OTH 2008, Lemma 4.1), a
p-dominant equilibrium with low p is an MP-maximizer.
Fact 4 (Morris and Ui 2005). If a∗ is a (strict) p-dominant equilibrium with P
i∈I pi < 1, then a∗ is a (strict) MP-maximizer with the (strict) monotone









where C(a) = {i ∈ I |ai = a∗
i}.
Note that 2×2 coordination games generically have a (unique) strict MP-
and LP-maximizer. On the other hand, Morris (1999) shows that there is a
non-empty open set of symmetric 4 × 4 supermodular games that have no
MP- or LP-maximizer.6
In the next section, we obtain the generic existence of strict MP- (as well
as LP-) maximizer for the case inbetween, namely, the class of symmetric
3 × 3 supermodular coordination games. We also show that these games
may have multiple strict LP-maximizers.
6Morris (1999) presents an example of a symmetric 4×4 supermodular game satisfying
diminishing marginal returns that has no robust equilibrium in the sense of Kajii and
Morris (1997) (and it remains valid with a small perturbation of payoﬀs). Since, as shown
by Morris and Ui (2005), an MP-maximizer of a supermodular game must be a robust
equilibrium, it follows that this game has no MP-maximizer. Furthermore, since it satisﬁes
diminishing marginal returns, this game has no LP-maximizer, either.
53. Symmetric 3 × 3 Supermodular Coordination Games
We consider symmetric 3 × 3 coordination games, where I = {1,2}, A1 =
A2 = {0,1,2}, u1(h,k) = u2(k,h) for all h,k ∈ {0,1,2}, and all the action
proﬁles on the diagonal are Nash equilibria, i.e., u1(h,h) ≥ u1(k,h) for all k.
We assume strict supermodularity, i.e., u1(h0,k) − u1(h,k) < u1(h0,k0) −
u1(h,k0) if h < h0 and k < k0.












h0k0 > 0 means that action h0 is better than action k0





h0k0. Note also that ∆hk
hk > 0 if and only if h pairwise
risk-dominates k.
3.1. MP-Maximizer
We have the following complete characterization (for generic games) of the
strict MP-maximizer. Recall from Fact 1 that a strict MP-maximizer is




01 > 0 and ∆02
02 > 0: (0,0) is the strict MP-maximizer.
(2) ∆20
21 > 0 and ∆20
20 > 0: (2,2) is the strict MP-maximizer.
(3) ∆02
10 ≥ 0 and ∆02
12 ≥ 0:
(a) (0,0) is the strict MP-maximizer if ∆01
01 > 0 and either (i) ∆12
12 ≥ 0
or (ii) ∆21





(b) (1,1) is the strict MP-maximizer if ∆10
10 > 0 and ∆12
12 > 0.
(c) (2,2) is the strict MP-maximizer if ∆21
21 > 0 and either (i) ∆10
10 ≥ 0
or (ii) ∆01






Result 1. Every generic symmetric 3 × 3 supermodular coordination game
has a strict MP-maximizer.
In the cases (1), (2), and (3–b), the strict MP-maximizer is also a strict
p-dominant equilibrium for some p < 1/2, while in the other cases, there is
no p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1/2.
63.2. LP-Maximizer
The generic existence of LP-maximizer has been shown by Morris (1999)
(see also FMP 2003).
Fact 5 (Morris 1999, FMP 2003). Every generic symmetric 3 × 3 super-
modular coordination game has at least one strict LP-maximizer.
This follows from the following classiﬁcation reported in Morris (1999)
and FMP (2003), which they prove only for two cases. In the Appendix, we
provide a proof that covers all the cases.
Proposition 2.
(a) (0,0) is a strict LP-maximizer if ∆01
01 > 0 and either (i) ∆12
12 ≥ 0 or
(ii) ∆21





(b) (1,1) is a strict LP-maximizer if ∆10
10 > 0 and ∆12
12 > 0.
(c) (2,2) is a strict LP-maximizer if ∆21
21 > 0 and either (i) ∆10
10 ≥ 0 or
(ii) ∆01





However, we show that this is only a partial characterization, in that




01 > 0, then (0,0) is a strict LP-maximizer.
(2) If ∆20
21 > 0, then (2,2) is a strict LP-maximizer.
These conditions (1) and (2) can be simultaneously satisﬁed by a non-
empty open set of symmetric 3×3 supermodular coordination games. Thus,
we have:
Result 2. There is a non-empty open set of symmetric 3×3 supermodular
coordination games that have two strict LP-maximizers.
Observe that by supermodularity, ∆02
01 > 0 and ∆20
21 > 0 imply ∆01
01 > 0
and ∆21
21 > 0, respectively. Therefore, multiplicity occurs in subcases of the
cases (a–ii) and (c–ii) in Proposition 2. In these cases, the game cannot
have diminishing marginal returns, i.e., the inequalities, ∆02
01 > 0, ∆20
21 > 0,
u1(1,0) − u1(0,0) ≥ u1(2,0) − u1(1,0), and u1(1,2) − u1(0,2) ≥ u1(2,2) −
u1(1,2), cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. On the other hand, the game
may satisfy the weaker property of own-action quasi-concavity (FMP 2003):
the game is said to be own-action quasiconcave if for all i ∈ I, the set
{ai ∈ Ai | ui(ai,a−i) ≥ c} is convex (i.e., it is written as [a0
i,a00
i ] for some
a0
i,a00
i ∈ Ai) for all a−i ∈ A−i and all constants c.
Example 1. Consider the following supermodular coordination game, which









01 = 2, ∆21
21 = 5, ∆02
10 = −1, ∆02






20 = 1. Thus, this game falls in Case (a–ii) in Proposition 2
(and in Case (2) in Proposition 1), and Proposition 3 applies.
This game has two strict LP-maximizers, (0,0) and (2,2), while (2,2)
is the unique strict MP-maximizer (and 7/15-dominant). Local potential
functions are given by the following (the function (b) is also a monotone
















(b) Local potential function for (2,2)
When the game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns (in which case a
strict LP-maximizer is unique by Fact 3), the unique strict LP-maximizer
is given by the classiﬁcation of Proposition 2. This follows by verifying the
strict LP-maximizer given in the classiﬁcation is also a strict MP-maximizer
as given in Proposition 1.
Remark 1. Example 1 is also a counterexample to Theorem 4 in FMP (2003),
which claims that an LP-maximizer of a supermodular game that satisﬁes
own-action quasiconcavity is noise-independent selection in global games:
the game in Example 1 shows that this claim contradicts the limit uniqueness
result of FMP (2003, Theorem 1). A correct statement should read that a
(strict) LP-maximizer of a supermodular game that satisﬁes diminishing
marginal returns (or own-action concavity) is noise-independent selection.
More generally, one can show that a strict MP-maximizer of a supermodular
game is noise-independent selection in global games.
8Appendix
We denote u1(h,k) = whk; thus ∆hk
h0k0 = wh0h + wh0k − wk0h − wk0k.
Proof of Proposition 1. Case (1): (0,0) is a strict p-dominant equilibrium
with p < 1/2, so that Fact 4 applies.
Case (2): Symmetric with Case (1).






01 ε(w01 − w11)
ε(w02 − w12)
+ (w21 − w11)
ε(w01 − w11) 0 w21 − w11
ε(w02 − w12)
+ (w21 − w11)
w21 − w11 0
where ε > 0 is suﬃciently small. All entries but v(0,0) are less than or equal
to zero (recall w02−w12 < w01−w11 ≤ 0 and w21−w11 ≤ 0 by assumption).
By verifying that





v(1,k) − v(2,k) ≤ u1(1,k) − u1(2,k),
v(0,k) − v(2,k) ≤ u1(1,k) − u1(2,k)
for all k (let ε be suﬃciently small, and use w20 − w10 < w21 − w11 and
∆12
12 ≥ 0), one can show that the conditions in Deﬁnition 1(b) (with a∗ =
(0,0)) are satisﬁed.





ε ε + λ1(w10 − w00)
λ1(w02 − w12)
+ λ2(w12 − w22)
ε + λ1(w10 − w00) −λ2∆21
21 λ2(w12 − w22)
λ1(w02 − w12)
+ λ2(w12 − w22)
λ2(w12 − w22) 0














10 = 0, in which case ∆02
12 > 0, let ∆02
12/∆02
10 = ∞). This is the local
potential function given in Morris (1999). Verify that
























Case (3–b): (1,1) is a strict p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1/2.
Case (3–c): Symmetric with Case (3–a).
Proof of Proposition 2. Case (a–i): The monotone potential function con-
structed in Case (3–a–i) in the proof of Proposition 1 works also as a local
potential function for (0,0).
Case (a–ii–1): ∆01
01 > 0, ∆21






The monotone potential function constructed in Case (3–a–ii) in the proof
of Proposition 1 works also as a local potential function for (0,0).
Case (a–ii–2): ∆01
01 > 0, ∆21






Follows from Proposition 3(1).
Case (b): (1,1) is a strict p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1/2. The
monotone potential function given in Fact 4 works also as a local potential
function for (1,1).
Case (c): Symmetric with Case (a).







01 w02 − w12 w02 − w12
w02 − w12 ε(w11 − w21) 0
w02 − w12 0 ε(w22 − w12)
where ε > 0 is suﬃciently small. Verify that
v(0,k) − v(1,k) ≤ u1(0,k) − u1(1,k),





Case (2): Symmetric with Case (1).
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